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Local Government Law
By R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*

In this day, the general practice which does not typically touch upon
some aspect of "local government law" is a rare one indeed. What may
once have been peripheral has become truly central. These realities were
duly reflected during the survey period, when the appellate courts rendered
more than 80 material decisions and the General Assembly enacted more
than 20 notable measures.
The court decisions are arranged by subject matter, and only the most
noteworthy legislative products are included. Not surveyed are local and
special enactments, population statutes, and resolutions proposing amendments to the constitution but not yet ratified.
Welcome to a lively legal locale.

A.

Municipalities

Home Rule
A familiar facet of Georgia's twisted history of municipal "home rule"
was the 1954 evolution of the following constitutional authorization:
The General Assembly is authorized to provide by law for the selfgovernment of municipalities and to that end is hereby expressly given the
power to delegate its powers so that matters pertaining to municipalities
upon which, prior to the ratification of this amendment, it was necessary
for the General Assembly to act, may be dealt with without the necessity
of action by the General Assembly ....
Although most of the later debate has focused upon what that authorization possibly permitted, recent litigation sought to posture it in a position
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. University of Georgia (A.B.,
1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard Law School (LL.M., 1961). Member of the Georgia Bar.
Deep appreciation is expressed to the Institute of Government of the University of Georgia
for monetary summer research support by virtue of which the preparation of this survey was
made possible.
1. GA. CONST. art. XV, §I, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-8301 (1973). For treatment of this history
and its ramifications, see Sentell, Home Rule Benefits or Homemade Problems for Georgia
Local Governments?, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 317 (1968), "Home Rule:" Its Impact on Georgia Local
Government Law, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 277 (1972), reprinted in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw

273, 287 (2d ed. 1973).
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of prohibition. Thus, the survey period case of State v. Golial presented
an attack upon the validity of the "Uniform Beer Tax Act of 1974,"1 and
the challengers' "main contention" was that the General Assembly's imposition of the tax violated "the municipality's right to govern itself' under
the constitutional authorization.' Rejecting that contention, a unanimous
supreme court viewed the authorization as a "grant" rather than a "limitation."' The court deemed it immaterial that the General Assembly had
previously utilized this grant to delegate various "home rule" powers to
municipalities.' That action did not raise a "constitutional bar. . . . prohibiting the General Assembly from legislating directly in that same area
' 7
at a later date.
The legislature's primary utilization of the 1954 authorization is embodied in the "Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965,"1 and that statute gave rise
to Jackson v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge.' That controversy arose
from the municipality's demotion of policemen and projected disagreement over the status of the ordinance under which the action had been
taken. Concluding that the "reorganization ordinance" constituted a
"home rule" amendment to the municipal charter,10 a majority of the
supreme court was thus forced to confront the argument of a defective
enactment procedure. The court observed that the ordinance had been
properly advertised, adopted and filed in the office of the Secretary of
State; it conceded a failure to file with the clerk of superior court but
discounted the importance of that statutory requirement." "In these circumstances," held the court, "this amounted to substantial compliance
with the legal requirements necessary to effect a charter change under the
2. 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).
3. Ga. Laws, 1974, p. 1447, GA. CODE ANN. §58-706.1 (Supp. 1975).
4. 235 Ga. at 798, 222 S.E.2d at 33. The challengers had also raised due process and equal
protection arguments against the statute, and the court rejected them.
5. The court quoted from one of its opinions in Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of
Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970). For a discussion of all the opinions in that case,
see Sentell, MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia:Nay-Sayers Beware, 5 GA. L. REV. 499 (1971),
reprinted in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 363 (2d ed. 1973).
6. Indeed, the court noted that the delegation itself expressly reserved the General Assembly's power of preemption. GA. CODE ANN. §69-1018 (Supp. 1974).
7. 235 Ga. at 799, 222 S.E.2d at 33.
8. GA. CODE ANN. §§69-1015 to 69-1021 (Supp. 1975).
9. 234 Ga. 906, 218 S.E.2d 633 (1975).
10. The court said that the ordinance "was meant to become a part of the charter so that
it could not be summarily repealed by a mere ordinance that could be enacted by the council
in a 2-day period." 234 Ga. at 912, 218 S.E.2d at 637. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Undercofler and Chief Justice Nichols disagreed with this conclusion.
11. These are all requirements contained in the home rule statute. GA. CODE ANN. §691020 (1967). The court said: "After many months of operation under the ordinance as adopted
and filed in the office of the Secretary of State, this court is unwilling to hold that the mere
failure to also file the completed ordinance in the office of the clerk of court made it an
ineffective charter amendment." 234 Ga. at 913, 218 S.E.2d at 638.
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1965 Home Rule Act." 21
Because Jackson is one of the first cases in which the supreme court has
plumbed the details of the municipal home rule statute, the signal of the
decision may be an important one. One can be sympathetic with the
court's desire to save the ordinance and still remain unenthusiastic over
the prospects of yet another "substantial compliance" quagmire in Georgia
3
municipal law.'
Dissolution
The most traumatic stage in the life of a municipal corporation is its
death. For almost 30 years that stage has been an extremely confusing one
in Georgia, primarily because of the existence of a 1947 general statute
purporting to authorize municipal dissolution by the petition of registered
voters and an order of the superior court."4 To many observers, the history
of municipal annexation in Georgia pointed rather forcefully to the conjectoral conclusions that dissolution was a state legislative power, that dissolution was truly the power which the general statute purported to delegate,
that the validity of that delegation must be determined as of 1947, and that
when so evaluated the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of state
legislative power.' 5 For those seeking or depending upon the dissolution of
a municipal corporation under the 1947 general statute, therefore, prospects appeared perilous.'"
During the current survey period, Harrell v. Courson" squarely presented the issue to the Supreme Court of Georgia; and a majority of that
court sustained the validity of the dissolution statute. 8 The court reasoned
that the prohibition against the delegation of legislative power did not
apply when no legislative power had been delegated. By enacting the stat12. Id. On another point of potential importance, the supreme court expressly agreed with
the following conclusion of the trial judge: "The Reorganization Ordinance is not a local or
special bill as those terms are used in art. M, §7, 15 of the Constitution of the State of
Georgia and, therefore, did not have to be enacted in accordance with the procedural requirements of said constitutional provision." Id. at 909, 218 S.E.2d at 636.
13. See, e.g., Sentell, Georgia Municipal Tort Liability: Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REV.
134 (1969), reprinted in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 497 (2d ed.
1973).
14. GA. CODE ANN. §69-105 (1967). The petition is filed by a majority of the voters with
the superior court when the municipality has not functioned under its corporate charter for
a period of ten years, and the court is authorized to order the municipality dissolved.
15. These conjectures are developed, and authorities for them are treated, in Sentell,
Selected Oddities in Georgia Municipal Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 783, 807-15 (1975).
16. Prospects might also appear perilous for those seeking municipal dissolutions by local
statutes; the fear is that the 1947 general statute triggers the constitution's prohibition of local
or special statutes on the subject. GA. CONST. art. I, §4, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-401 (1973).
17. 234 Ga. 350, 216 S.E.2d 105 (1975).
18. For discussion of the case, see Sentell, Selected Oddities in Georgia Municipal Law,
9 GA. L. REV. 783, 813 (1975).
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ute in 1947, the General Assembly had at that time exercised the legislative power of municipal dissolution. Actions under that statute, consequently, are not exercises of such power."
The filing of a petition for dissolution of the charter by a majority of the
registered voters is merely one of the conditions provided in the statute
for the application of the statute to a particular municipality. Neither the
court nor the voters exercise the power of dissolution. It is exercised by
the legislature through the statute upon the occurrence of the conditions
stated therein. 0
In this fashion, the court thus dispelled some of the doubts which had
lingered so long around the dissolution of Georgia municipalities. After
Harrell v. Courson, however, the prediction of what constitutes a traditional delegation of legislative power in Georgia is a hazardous undertaking
indeed."
Elections
In Garnto v. Wheeler2" the plaintiff showed that he received two votes
more than another candidate for the office of mayor and demanded that
he be installed under the municipal charter provision that "the person who
shall receive the highest number of votes shall be declared duly elected."
Agreeing with the existence of the charter provision, the supreme court
noted that the loosing candidate had contested the election under the
Georgia Municipal Election Code.24 The court then upheld the trial judge's
order of a hearing on the protest-the order the plaintiff had appealed-and reasoned that the charter provision "plainly comprehends
' 25
only unprotested elections.
Officers and Employees
The period under scrutiny witnessed a variety of contests concerning
municipal officers and employees. One of these was Higginbotham v.
Harden,26 an action by a former police officer charging conspiracy on the
19. "We hold the court was not exercising legislative power in rendering its judgment but
was acting judicially as it is empowered to do . . . . Similarly, we hold that, under the terms
of this statute, there is no delegation of legislative authority to a majority of the voters of
municipalities." Id. at 353, 216 S.E.2d at 107-08.
20. Id. at 353, 216 S.E.2d at 108.
21. In a forceful dissenting opinion for himself and Justice Hill, Justice Ingram viewed
annexation law to be controlling and declared the dissolution statute unconstitutional, "if
stare decisis is still a valid doctrine." Id. at 355, 216 S.E.2d at 109.
22. 235 Ga. 405, 219 S.E.2d 721 (1975).
23. Id. at 406, 219 S.E.2d at 723.
24. GA. CODE ANN. §34A-1501(a) (1970).
25. 235 Ga. at 406, 219 S.E.2d at 723. Thus, no conflict existed between the charter and
the election code.
26. 137 Ga. App. 143, 223 S.E.2d 156 (1975).
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part of the city manager and the police chief in respect to his suspension
and dismissal." Pointing out the plaintiff's concession that the defendants
"had the absolute right to hire and fire him, without cause or justification,"2" the court of appeals reversed the trial judge's refusal to direct a
verdict: "A conspiracy, although wrongful in motive, to effect what one has
a legal right to accomplish is not actionable."29
Another subject of controversy was the disposition of municipal
employee-pension funds. In Nash v. Tinch,30 for instance, the supreme
court considered the claim of the administratrix of the named beneficiary
of an employee who died before retirement. Because the death of the beneficiary had occurred prior to that of the employee, the court held that no
designated beneficiary had been in existence and that the pension funds
had passed to the employee's estate.'
Likewise focusing upon pension funds, but in an entirely different context, was Thompson v. Hornsby.32 There a former municipal policeman
sought a mandamus to transfer his municipal funds to the pension fund
of his new employer, the county. In sustaining the issuance of the mandamus, the supreme court concluded that the county possessed the power to
operate a police department, 33 that the material statute provided for the
transfer, 34 that the transfer did not constitute taxation by one governmental unit for pensions of employees of another unit,35 and that the transfer
38
of the funds was not a discretionary matter.
In two decisions, the court of appeals indicated a sympathetic approach
to claims by municipal employees for workmen's compensation benefits.
27. The plaintiff sought both lost earnings and punitive damages, and the jury had
awarded them.
28. 137 Ga. App. at 144, 223 S.E.2d at 157. The plaintiff's argument was that the defendants had exercised their power in a wilful and wanton manner. The plaintiff had also alleged
defendants' interference with his efforts to obtain other employment, but the court of appeals
found no evidence to this effect.
29. 137 Ga. App. at 144, 223 S.E.2d at 157. Another police discharge controversy of the
period resulted in Ball v. Police Comm. of Atlanta, 136 Ga. App. 144, 220 S.E.2d 479 (1975).
There the court held that the committee's conviction of the policeman was a "judicial proceeding" for which certiorari would lie but that alleged errors in the conviction were not
substantiated by evidence before the court.
30. 235 Ga. 654, 221 S.E.2d 425 (1975).
31. The court reached this conclusion under a "strict construction" approach to the statute which provided that if a "person" had not been named as beneficiary, the funds would
pass to the estate. The word "person," said the court, meant "a person in life at the death of
the employee." 235 Ga. at 655, 221 S.E.2d at 426.
32. 235 Ga. 561, 221 S.E.2d 192 (1975).
33. The court said this power arose under a 1972 amendment to the constitution, Ga.
Laws, 1972, p. 1552, GA. CODE ANN. §2-7901a (1973).
34. Ga. Laws, 1972, p. 3277.
35. "Retirement pay is 'adjusted compensation' for salary earned, payable in the future."
235 Ga. at 565, 221 S.E.2d at 196.
36. "There is no merit in the appellants' contention that the Trustees have a discretion
in transferring pension funds under the 1972 Act ....
" 235 Ga. at 566, 221 S.E.2d at 197.
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The court in City Council of Augusta v. Williams37 considered a heart
attack suffered by a municipal policeman shortly after he went on duty.
Relying upon evidence that the claimant was under "severe emotional
stress" and a physician's testimony that this stress "might or could have"
contributed to the attack, the court upheld the award of workmen's compensation. In U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Atlanta,"' the court held
that an off-duty policeman who worked with permission as a theater security officer and who was killed while controlling a disturbance there, satisfied statutory requirements that his death arise out of and in the course of
his municipal employment. The court held that the municipality was a
joint employer of the officer and would be required to contribute to the
payment of benefits. The court reasoned that "if he had not been there,
Weis would have called on the City of Atlanta to send policemen to put
down the disturbance." 39
Legislation
One of the Georgia Constitution's most familiar proscriptions is that "no
special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made
by an existing general law."0 The questions raised by this proscription
appear almost limitless, but the most constant one is the thrust of the
prohibition itself. If special statutes-including municipal ordinances-are invalid when a general statute is in "conflict," that is one
thing. If such statutes are invalid when a general statute has dealt even
superficially with the "subject area," that is another. Either way the ramifications are tremendous, and local government law is a direct recipient of
41
them.
The court of appeals was confronted with this general quandary in Pace
v. City of Atlanta,42 a challenge to the following municipal ordinance:
It shall be unlawful for any person male or female, to enter into any
agreement with a person of the opposite sex for the purpose of having illicit
with such person for consideration in money or other propsex relations
43
erty.
37. 137 Ga. App. 177, 223 S.E.2d 227 (1976).
38. 135 Ga. App. 390, 217 S.E.2d 647 (1975).
39. 135 Ga. App. at 392, 217 S.E.2d at 648. "Here, this police officer while performing a
security job, was called upon, as an officer, to control, subdue, arrest or disband persons
causing a disturbance in a theater. He was then and there shot and killed by one of those
participating in the disturbance. He was in the performance of a police function, and on duty
in an emergency."
40. GA. CONST. art. I, §4, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-401 (1973).
41. For a discussion, see Sentell, When is a Special Law Unlawfully Special?, 27 MER. L.
REV. 1167 (1976).
42. 135 Ga. App. 399, 218 S.E.2d 128 (1975).
43. Id. at 399-400, 218 S.E.2d at 129.
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The court first relied upon prior decisions and established the following
principle:
Even though a special law deals with some remote subject matter embraced in the general law, which segment or element is not dealt with by
the general law, does not alter the fact that such a special law is enacted
in a case where provision has been made by an existing general law."
The court then forcefully trained this precept upon the contested ordinance:
The State of Georgia by general statute having preempted the field by
defining illicit sexual relations in such statutes as Code Ann. §§26-202
(sodomy), 26-209 (adultery), 26-2010 (fornication), and 26-2012 (prostitution), and others, shows clearly that any one of the above named could
be covered by the city ordinance in having "illicit
sexual relations.., for
45
consideration in money or other property."
Accordingly, the conclusion was that the ordinance amounted to "a special
law enacted in a case for which provision has been made by the existing
general law" and violated the constitution. 6
Another avenue for attacking the validity of municipal legislation is to
focus upon the local government's legislative process.47 Ironically, this avenue was used by the municipality itself in City of Atlanta v. Foster &
Cooper, Inc.8 Defending against an action for breach of a construction
contract, the municipality argued that the mayor had never formally
signed the ordinance which authorized the contract and the contract therefore was not binding. Affording that argument the shortest of shrift, the
court noted the municipal charter provision that legislation became effective unless approved or vetoed in eight days and observed that the mayor
had taken no action upon the ordinance in issue. Consequently, "no signature was necessary here because of failure of the mayor to veto the ordinance within the required number of days.""
44. Id. at 400, 218 S.E.2d at 129. The court also noted the principle of strictly construing
criminal statutes.
45. Id. at 400-01, 218 S.E.2d at 129.
46. Id. at 401, 218 S.E.2d at 129. With this conclusion compare that reached by the
supreme court in Powell v. Gwinnett County Comm'rs, 234 Ga. 183, 214 S.E.2d 905 (1975),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 175-79 infra. In Sellers v. Home Furnishing Co.,
Inc., 235 Ga. 831, 222 S.E.2d 34 (1976), the supreme court rejected a challenge to the validity
of special statutes dealing with a municipal court by pointing out that a separate provision
of the constitution expressly authorizes the General Assembly to create such courts by special
legislation and to enact procedural rules for them without violating the special laws proscription.
47. See, e.g., Sentell, The Legislative Process in Georgia Local Government Law, 5 GA.
L. REv. 1 (1970), reprinted in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 193
(2d. ed. 1973).
48. 136 Ga. App. 159, 220 S.E.2d 724 (1975).
49. 136 Ga. App. at 161, 220 S.E.2d at 726.
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Contracts
Georgia law has traditionally frowned upon efforts of local governing
authorities to bargain away their power to govern and to dictate policies
to their successors. 50 This disapproval has manifested itself both in court
decisions and in the following legislative mandate: "One council may not
by an ordinance bind itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation
in matters of municipal government."'" In Simmons v. City of
Clarkesville," the supreme court relied upon this mandate to condemn an
alleged agreement by the municipality to aid the plaintiff in collecting a
"tap on" fee for sewer and water mains constructed by the plaintiff and
connected to municipal lines. Even had the plaintiff more conclusively
proved its existence, said the court,5 3 "such an agreement would attempt
to bind future governing authorities and would therefore be illegal." 54 It
was immaterial that the parties may have operated previously under such
an agreement; this would not correct its ultra vires
nature, and "the city
' 55
would not be estopped from denying its validity.
Even more forceful than the supreme court's application of the mandate
was the court of appeals' maneuver around it. At issue in City of Jonesboro
v. Clayton County Water Authority"6 was the validity of two thirty-year
contracts by which the authority agreed to treat sewage and provide water
for the municipality and to refrain from raising its rates for these services
unless an increase was necessary to service the revenue certificates which
financed the systems. When the authority later sought to revise its rates
without limitation, it contended that the contracts violated the statutory
mandate and therefore were ultra vires and void. Rejecting this contention,
the court of appeals rested upon a two-pronged analysis. First, the court
found freedom to ignore the general statutory mandate in the special statute which created the authority. In taking this tack, the court not only
glossed the "equal dignity" precept of statutory law 57 but also was forced
to distinguish an earlier decision by the supreme court." Second, the court
50. See Sentell, Local Government and Contracts that Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969),
reprinted in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 397 (2d ed. 1973).
51. GA. CODE ANN. §69-202 (1933).
52. 234 Ga. 530, 216 S.E.2d 826 (1975).
53. It upheld the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence
of the alleged agreement.
54. 234 Ga. at 531, 216 S.E.2d at 827.
55. Id. The court upheld the trial judge in directing a verdict for the municipality.
56. 136 Ga. App. 768, 222 S.E.2d 76 (1975).
57. The court did not explain the method by which a mere special or local statute could
be elevated to a position of priority over a general statute.
58. That case was Screws v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839, 8 S.E.2d 16 (1940), in which
the supreme court invalidated a municipality's agreement to furnish free water to a fair
association to which it had leased property. Although a local statute had empowered the
municipality to execute the lease in its discretion, the court refused to construe that statute
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arbitrarily pronounced the authority immune to the mandate: "Furthermore, we do not regard Code Ann. sec. 69-202 as prohibiting authorities,
as distinguished from municipalities, from entering long term contracts.""
Not only is that approach in tension with prior evolution of the mandate,"0
but the court also apparently viewed the two contracts as binding only
upon the water authority."
City of Jonesboro v. Clayton County Water Authority thus added another seam to the tangled web which the Georgia courts have recently
woven as they attempt to defang precepts no longer held in judicial favor.
However desirable the results of this disguised transition eventually may
prove to be, the law of binding contracts in local government presently is
unpredictable.
The holdings triggered by two other contract controversies were of more
routine flavor. In Atlanta Suburbia Estates, Ltd. v. DeKalb Federal S &
L, 6 3 the supreme court was confronted with an agreement in a lease of a
sewage treatment facility from a developer to the municipality. Holding
that the rights reserved by the developer in that lease referred only to lots
not already developed, the court concluded that the reservation gave the
municipality no power to deny a tap-on permit for a lot that was previously
developed. 4 In City of Atlanta v. Foster & Cooper, Inc.," the court of
appeals upheld a summary judgment against the municipality for breach
of a construction contract. Rebuffing the municipality's argument of lack
to authorize a binding contract condemned by the general statutory mandate. In City of
Jonesboro, the court of appeals interpreted Screws to mean that "had the City of Atlanta
been authorized by the General Assembly to furnish the property with water the outcome of
the case would have been different." 136 Ga. App. at 774, 222 S.E.2d at 81. Actually, a more
appropriate authority than Screws for what the court of appeals obviously wished to accomplish in City of Jonesboro would have been City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 205
Ga. 843, 55 S.E.2d 540 (1949). For a discussion of this vague "exception" to the general rule,
see Sentell, Local Government and Contracts that Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969), reprinted
in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 397 (2d ed. 1973).
59. 136 Ga. App. at 774, 222 S.E.2d at 82.
60. In Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960),
the court had expressly held the statute applicable to counties; and in Smith v. Ouzts, 214
Ga. 144, 103 S.E.2d 567 (1958), the supreme court had strongly indicated its applicability to
county boards of education.
61. Apparently it never occurred to the court that the same contracts that it held bound
the authority also bound the municipality and that whether or not the mandate applied to
the authority, it definitely applied to the municipality. "Thus, the authority contends that
its contracts with the city were ultra vires in that the authority unlawfully committed itself
to the contract rates for the duration of the contracts." 136 Ga. App. at 773, 222 S.E.2d at
81.
62. For a discussion, see Sentell, Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law:
Recent Perspectives, 11 GA. ST. B.J. 148 (1975).
63. 236 Ga. 315, 223 S.E.2d 695 (1976).
64. Consequently the court sustained the trial judge's granting of a mandamus for the
issuance of the permit.
65. 136 Ga. App. 159, 220 S.E.2d 724 (1975).
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of execution, the court responded with the following principle of contract
law:
Written signature to a contract is to afford mutuality, but is not the only
method of obtaining mutuality. Part performance by both parties satisfies
the requisites of mutuality and the statute of frauds . . . .Here, plaintiff
had already incurred expense of $20,874 in obtaining insurance and bonds
required by the city.6"
Powers
In an arresting array of decisions over the past year, the appellate courts
have puzzled over the perplexities of municipal power. 7 One segment of
these decisions focused upon the continuously controversial domain of licenses and permits. That this domain abuts constitutional plateaus was
forcefully demonstrated by the supreme court's treatment of Mayor &
Aldermen of Savannah v. TWA, Inc."5 The "central and dispositive question" there posited, said the court, was "whether a municipal government
may use the denial of a business license, coupled with threats to prosecute
criminally for doing business without a license, as a means of suppressing
suspected pornography without hearing any specific proof whatsoever of
obscenity." 9 To deny business licenses in these circumstances, the court
concluded, "amounted to 'prior restraint of First Amendment rights,'"
and justified the trial judge's order that the licenses be issued.70
Again looking at licensing but lacking a constitutional thrust was the
court's decision in Holcomb v. Gray.7 A 1973 statutory amendment was
interpreted to change the prior rule that a municipality could issue licenses
for the sale of liquor by the drink only in that part of its territorial limits
within a county in which package stores were authorized. 2 Since that
amendment, therefore, a municipality which has approved by referendum
the licensing of the sale of liquor by the drink is authorized to issue licenses
for such sales in municipal areas even in a "dry" county." From this it
66. Id. at 160-61, 220 S.E.2d at 726.
67. See generally, Sentell, Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV.
614 (1974); Sentell, Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in GeorgiaLocal Government
Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974).
68. 233 Ga. 885, 214 S.E.2d 370 (1975).
69. 233 Ga. at 886, 214 S.E.2d at 372. The court viewed the evidence as showing that the
municipality had denied licenses for books, magazines, and coin-operated machines because
of a suspicion that the applicants were going to sell pornographic materials.
70. Id. at 886, 214 S.E.2d at 372. The court said the applicants had complied "with all
the requirements necessary for obtaining business licenses to sell materials that are protected
by the First Amendment."
71. 234 Ga. 7, 214 S.E.2d 512 (1975).
72. Ga. Laws, 1973, p. 610, GA. CODE ANN. §58-1083(a) (Supp. 1975).
73. Otherwise, said the court, it would be attributing to the General Assembly the intent
to do a useless act by the 1973 amendment.
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followed that the municipality could be mandamused to consider an application for such a license.
Fully as explosive as pornography and liquor is the freedom of welldigging, and that was the point of City of Hawkinsville v. Clark.,4 There
the court of appeals held "unconstitutional on its face"75 a municipal ordinance that penalized the digging of a well without a permit and which
declared that the grant or refusal of the permit was in "the sole discretion"
of the municipality." Declaring well-digging to be "a perfectly lawful undertaking," the court discovered two defects in the ordinance. First, it
granted arbitrary authority without prescribing any guides for exercise; 7
second, it failed to provide an applicant with an opportunity to be heard."
Another popular subject of power disputes is the area in which the municipality legitimately can act. Generally the power to operate extraterritorially requires express authority, and that principle is rendered explicit in
Georgia by a statutory declaration that "officers of an incorporated municipality shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of
such municipality unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other laws."'79
The reach of this prohibition constituted the issue for decision in two of
the cases decided during the period surveyed.
In Wright v. State ° the court of appeals discovered express authority for
an extraterritorial arrest in a population statute providing for police service
functions shared by a municipality and a county.8 Under that statute,
held the court, a municipal police officer assigned to the unincorporated
area of the county possessed authority to make arrests in that area, and
"the arrest in this case was legal." '
Without express statutory authority for such arrests, justification depends upon judicially discovered "exceptions" to the rule. In Wooten v.
State the court formulated as an exception "instances in which a crime
is committed in the municipality and the officer's 'hot pursuit' takes him
74. 135 Ga. App. 875, 219 S.E.2d 577 (1975).
75. Id. at 876, 219 S.E.2d at 579.
76. Id. at 875, 219 S.E.2d at 578.
77. The court agreed that it was reasonable for a municipality to regulate such an undertaking in the exercise of its police powers but held that this regulation could not be hinged
upon arbitrary discretion. Partiality was not precluded under the ordinance.
78. Thus, the defendant's conviction under the ordinance was invalidated. Likewise dealing with municipal permits but concluded upon a procedural point was Branch v. Atlanta
Housing Authority, 134 Ga. App. 906, 216 S.E.2d 633 (1975). There property owners appealed
a decision refusing to revoke a building permit but did not seek to prevent the work from
proceeding under an order of supersedeas. Thus, the court held that the issue of the validity
of the permit had become moot because the work in issue had been completed.
79. GA. CODE ANN. §92A-509 (1972).
80. 134 Ga. App. 406, 214 S.E.2d 688 (1975).
81. Ga. Laws, 1951, p. 591, GA. CODE ANN. ch. 23-14 (1971).
82. 134 Ga. App. at 407, 214 S.E.2d at 689. Consequently, the court sustained the trial
judge in overruling the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
83. 135 Ga. App. 97,17 S.E.2d 350 (1975).
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beyond his geographical limits to effectuate the arrest."84 The court extended that exception to cover not only the arrest of the one pursued but
the additional arrest of one interfering with the officer's duties after the
original capture had been accomplished. Accordingly, the court upheld the
arrest of one who allegedly struck the officer as he attempted to direct
traffic around the pursued vehicle. 5
Accounting for still another decision on municipal power-specifically,
the police power to regulate outdoor signs-was the controversy presented
by City of Doraville v. Turner Communications Corp.88 Challenged was the
municipality's adoption of an ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertising
signs within 500 feet of an expressway right-of-way as well as its notification that the challenger's sign be removed within a two-year period. Rejecting the challenge, the supreme court held that adoption of the ordinance
was within the municipality's police power,87 that the subject was not
preempted by state law,88 and that the order of removal did not constitute
a municipal "taking" of private property.89
Of a miscellaneous but no less important nature was the supreme court's
decision in Trax, Inc. v. City of College Park.10 When private parties
blocked a stream that constituted a part of the municipal drainage system,
the court held it not only a power but a duty of the municipality to obtain
relief.91 Consequently, a directed verdict for the municipality in its action
to enjoin the maintenance of the obstruction was affirmed.
84. Id. at 98, 217 S.E.2d at 351.
85. "We cannot agree with appellant's contention that Officer Williams was instantly
Reason compels this court
stripped of his authority once McBee's arrest was effectuated ....
to conclude that the Acworth policeman's legal authority under the hot pursuit doctrine
included both the power to arrest and the power to perform other normal police functions
incidental to and necessitated by the arrest." Id. at 99, 217 S.E.2d at 351-52.
86. 236 Ga. 385, 223 S.E.2d 798 (1976).
87. Thus, the court also rejected the challenger's contention that the ordinance was a
zoning measure and procedurally defective.
88. The court pointed to a provision in the general code of public transportation to the
effect that it did not affect more restrictive municipal ordinances on the subject. For a
discussion of this questionable legislative practice, see Sentell, Selected Oddities in Georgia
Municipal Law, 9 GA. L. REv. 783, 793-801 (1975).
89. The court reasoned that "there can be no 'taking' of property in this case, because
the original sign permit [in 1965], the equivalent of a license issued by the city, was for a
two-year period, and since 1966, both Burke and Turner were placed on notice of the twoyear amortization provision contained in the ordinances duly enacted by the city." 236 Ga.
at 388, 223 S.E.2d at 801.
90. 235 Ga. 835, 221 S.E.2d 595 (1976).
91. The court viewed the obstruction as "the major, if not the sole, proximate cause of
potential upstream flooding." And "it was the duty of the City of College Park to take needed
steps to maintain the flow of water in such creek whenever it became known that changes
had occurred which would reduce the flow of water so that flooding of public or private
property adjacent thereto was apt to occur, which flooding would constitute a nuisance." Id.
at 836, 221 S.E.2d at 596.
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Taxation
For many years, the official Code of Georgia has contained the following
command:
No municipal corporation shall levy or collect for the ordinary current
expenses of said corporation, except as hereinafter provided, any ad valorem tax upon the property within said corporation, exceeding one-half of
one per cent upon the value of said property, any charter of said corporation to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, that the provisions of
sections 92-4101 to 92-4104 shall not apply to the city of Savannah.'"
Although emphatic and absolute in thrust, this statute has been the subject of both judicial 3 and legislative 4 limitation over a long period of time.
Although the exact extent of its present reach is thus unknown," its recent
treatment by the Georgia Supreme Court has cleared up at least a part of
the confusion.
Town of Lyerly v. Short" contained an attack upon a ten-mill municipal
tax levy,' 7 one of the charges being violation of the quoted tax-rate command." A majority of the court agreed with that charge" and decided that
"the trial court correctly held that the municipal corporation was limited
in ad valorem taxation to one-half of one per cent on a forty per cent
assessed valuation of the property."" 0 With Town of Lyerly considered
92.

GA. CODE ANN. §92-4101 (1972).

93. In City of Cochran v. Lanfair, 139 Ga. 249, 77 S.E. 95 (1913), the supreme court
concluded that because of the original Savannah exception, the statute was never a general
one and thus its existence did not invalidate conflicting charter provisions already in being
or those enacted in the future.
94. Since the codification of this 1874 statute into the current official Code of 1933, the
General Assembly has amended it on 25 separate occasions, each of which expressly exempted
still another specified municipality from its coverage. See GA. CODE ANN. §92-4101 (1974).
95. For a discussion of the matter, see Sentell, Selected Oddities in Georgia Municipal
Law, 9 GA. L. REv. 783, 801-07 (1975).
96. 234 Ga. 877, 218 S.E.2d 588 (1975).
97. "The town stipulated that for the past several years its tax levy for ordinary current
expenses has been ten mills upon the county digest assessment of forty percent of fair market
value .. " Id. at 877, 218 S.E.2d at 589.
98. Another charge was that the property in issue was not within the corporate limits due
to the municipality's acquiescense in other boundaries for the past 75 years. The court held
that this acquiescence did not estop the town from ascertaining and fixing new boundaries
by a new survey but that taxes levied upon property included within the town by virtue of
that survey could operate prospectively only.
99. Justice Gunter dissented.
100. 234 Ga. at 878, 218 S.E.2d at 589. The court also concluded, however, that a 1975
statute, Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 774, GA. CODE ANN. §92-3901a et seq. (Supp. 1975), providing for
refunds of taxes illegally collected, operated only prospectively and the municipality could
thus retain the excessive taxes it had collected from the challengers. Justices Hall and Hill
dissented on this point of prospective operation, id. at 881, 218 S.E.2d at 591, but agreed that
no refunds could be had by the challengers because no claims had been filed as required by
the statute.
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against the backdrop of prior evolution, the present tax-rate precept for
Georgia municipalities appears to be: In the absence of a charter provision
to the contrary and in the absence of specific legislative exemption, the
historic limitation of "one-half of one percent" is the controlling rule.
Exempted by statute from "taxation" are "places of religious worship
or burial." ' "' The issue for decision in Crestlawn Memorial Park, Inc. v.
City of Atlanta' was whether this exemption applied to a municipal "sanitary service charge" imposed for cleaning the street in front of the plaintiff's cemetery. Holding that it did not apply, a unanimous supreme court
first satisfied itself that the charges were expressly authorized by the municipality's charter. So armed, the court then proceeded to deny that "assessments" constitute "taxes:" "[U]nless the assessment is for general
revenue purposes," proclaimed the court, "it is not a tax for which the law
grants an exemption to 'places of religious worship or burial.' "103 Thus, the
validity of the charge was upheld. 04
In addition to ad valorem taxes and assessments, municipalities also rely
heavily upon occupation taxes. The reach of occupation tax ordinances is
typically a subject of dispute-a point appropriately made by two instances during the period under study.
Wanthal v. City of Atlanta'05 comprised appeals by a partner and an
employee from criminal convictions for failure to obtain "business licenses." Reversing the convictions, the court of appeals said: "Where a firm
is a partnership among certified public accountants, each of whom has
paid a professional occupation tax to the City of Atlanta, neither one of
the partners nor an employee in charge of the management consulting
division of the firm is guilty of an offense of failing to register such partnership and obtaining an additional business license, where management consulting is, under rules and regulations promulgated under the state licensing laws, one of the services rendered by public accountants. "'' 6
Providing an interesting contrast with Wanthal was City of Atlanta v.
Victoria Corp., 07 litigation over both the applicability and the validity of
an occupation-tax ordinance. The court, holding that two corporations
were doing buisness within the municipality, focused upon the fact that
money due the corporations was collected inside the municipality by the
corporate treasurer, who was paid a commission exclusively on amounts
101.

GA. CODE ANN. §92-201 (1974).
102. 235 Ga. 194, 219 S.E.2d 122 (1975).
103. Id. at 194-95, 219 S.E.2d at 123. The court conceded that "[oither states have
recognized a distinction between assessments for permanent improvements, such as paving,
and assessments of the kind involved in this case" but held Georgia not to follow that
approach.
104. No "manifest abuse of legislative authority" had been shown. Id.
105. 134 Ga. App. 419, 214 S.E.2d 694 (1975).
106. Id.
107. 135 Ga. App. 33, 217 S.E.2d 509 (1975).

19761

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

collected." 8 As to validity of the levy,' the court quoted the rule that "a
tax on sales, which may constitute a part or all of the business of the party
taxed, is not a tax on property within the meaning of the constitution,
merely because the tax is measured by the accounts receivable resulting
from sales.""'
Courts
In Ellett v. City of College Park,' the court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal of a petition for certiorari to review the defendant's conviction
of violating a municipal ordinance. "The rule is well established," explained the court, "that the filing of security bond or pauper's affidavit
• . .is a condition precedent to an application for certiorari to review a
judgment of conviction in city court.""'
Liability
Disputing the adage about the impossibility of fighting city hall, most
plaintiffs now appear to relish the opportunity. Again during this survey
period, municipalities loomed as lightning rods to litigation."
Some of the controversies received little more judicial attention than
5
factionalizing by function." 4 Thus, in Englanderv. City of East Point" the
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of an action for damages to the
plaintiff's motorcycle, which the plaintiff had driven off a dead-end street.
Said the court: "Deciding whether to erect or not to erect a traffic control
sign or to maintain it after installation is an exercise of a governmental
function by a municipality and it is not liable for any negligent performance of this function."" 6
108. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the treasurer worked in the
office of an attorney: "There is no evidence in the record that Mrs. Wood at any time was an
employee of Thomas B. West, attorney at law." Id. at 34, 217 S.E.2d at 510.
109. The trial judge had condemned the ordinance as imposing a tax upon the mere
ownership of land.
110. 135 Ga. App. at 34, 217 S.E.2d at 511. The court quoted from Pharr Road Inv. Co.
v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968). A dissenting opinion argued that the
money was collected as a part of legal business for which the attorney had paid a professional
tax to the municipality.
111. 135 Ga. App. 269, 217 S.E.2d 374 (1975).
112. Id. at 270, 217 S.E.2d at 375. Here, said the court, no attack had been made on the
statutes requiring the bond or affidavit, nor had a bond or affidavit been included by amendment to the writ.
113. See, generally, R. SENTELL, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA (2d ed.
1972).
114. For discussion of the "function test" in this exercise, see id. at 5-44.
115. 135 Ga. App. 487, 218 S.E.2d 161 (1975). The plaintiff's complaint rested upon the
municipality's alleged failure to post signs or barricades on the street.
116. 135 Ga. App. at 487, 218 S.E.2d at 162. The court also rejected the "street defect"
contention under GA. CODE ANN. §69-303 (1933).
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The court afforded similar treatment to the municipality's operation of
a hospital in Washington v. City of Columbus."' Rejecting a medical malpractice claim against the municipality, the court recounted the rule that
minus evidence of operation for profit, a municipal hospital constitutes a
governmental undertaking." 8
Completing the cycle was the dismissal in Pitts v.City of Macon"' of a
claim based upon the conduct of the municipality's chief of police. Rebuffing allegations that the plaintiff's stolen automobile had been recovered
by the police and sold to another and viewing the action as one in trover,
the court countered with the statutory proscription that "a municipal
corporation shall not be liable for the torts of policemen or other 1 officers
engaged in the discharge of the duties imposed on them by law."'
A popular alternative to the function hurdle is an action against the
municipality for the maintenance of a "nuisance.'' 1 Whatever the reach
of that concept, two recent cases demonstrate its potential for escaping the
grant of a summary judgment. In City of Rome v. Turk, 122
the supreme
court reached the following conclusion: "The allegations of wilful and wanton negligence of the city in the construction of the drainage ditch would
raise an issue as to whether the city, by the doing of a lawful act in such
an improper manner, had created a nuisance."' The same function received the same response from the court of appeals in Keller v. City of
Toccoa.'21 Again, the lower court was held to have erred in granting the
municipality's motion for summary judgment, and it was deemed immaterial that the drainage work was not performed on municipal property:
"Based on this record, the mere fact that where the injury occurred the
work was performed on an individual's property would not change the
essential issue as to whether the City of Toccoa was maintaining a nuisance."In
Still another route around municipal tort immunity for governmental
117.

118.

136 Ga. App. 682, 222 S.E.2d 583 (1975).

For a discussion of this rule, see R.
IN GEORGIA 30.
119.

SENTELL, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIAILrY

134 Ga. App. 467, 214 S.E.2d 720 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §69-307 (1967). For a discussion, see R. SENTELL, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 53.
121. For a discussion, see Sentell, Municipal Liability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"
Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 11 (1975).
122. 235 Ga. 223, 219 S.E.2d 97 (1975).
123. Id. at 226, 219 S.E.2d at 99. The court emphasized that on a motion for summary
judgment all inferences which can reasonably be drawn are to be construed in favor of the
party opposing the motion.
124. 137 Ga. App. 15, 223 S.E.2d 1 (1975).
125. Id. at 16, 223 S.E.2d at 2. In still another case simply touching upon this domain,
the supreme court refused to issue a mandamus to municipal commissioners to remove what
was alleged to be a street obstruction. The court explained that the petitioners had not carried
the burden of showing that the legal remedy to abate a nuisance would not be adequate relief.
Nesbitt v. Lewis, 235 Ga. 477, 220 S.E.2d 7 (1975).

120.
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functions is the one which derives from the constitution's command that
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged, for public purposes,
without just and adequate compensation being first paid ...
."I" This
was the route successfully pursued by owners of commercial property in
MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Datry.'"I There a majority of the supreme court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the
constitution's command applied to the municipality's proposed exclusion
of vehicular traffic from, and construction of a transit station in, the abutting public street.'28 These activities amounted to a municipal "taking" of
private property rights, the court held and were to be enjoined until "just
and adequate compensation" was first paid to the plaintiffs.' 9
In tort litigation against municipalities, an ever-present consideration is
the impact of the "ante litem notice" requirement,'30 and a substantial
body of case law has evolved around that point.'3 ' In three decisions during
the survey period, the court of appeals contributed further to the evolution.
A primary issue is that of to whom the notice must be presented, and the
court's decision in Washington v. City of Columbus'33 upheld the following
notice address: "Hon. J. R. Allen, Mayor, City of Columbus, Muscogee
County Courthouse, Office of Mayor, Columbus, Georgia, 31901." The
court's rationale was that "[s]ubstantial compliance is all that is required."' 33
Another issue under the notice requirement is that of to whom its provisions are applicable. In Barnum v. Martin'3' the court held that minority
was a disability which tolled the requirement and that a notice given to
the municipality by the plaintiff within six months after attaining majority
was timely. This was true, the court concluded, even though the minor had
been represented by next friend in litigating her claim against another
defendant approximately four years before giving notice to the municipality: "The statute will not run against a minor represented in litigation by
126.

GA. CONST. art. I, §3,

1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-301 (1973). For a discussion, see R.

SENTELL, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 134.

127. 235 Ga. 568, 220 S.E.2d 905 (1975).
128. The court said the evidence showed that the exclusion would cause some interference
with the plaintiff's easement of access and that the construction of the station would constitute an additional servitude on the underlying fee.
129. A dissenting opinion by Justice Gunter, concurred in by Justices Jordan and Hall,
contended that the activities did not amount to a per se "taking" of the plaintiffs' property
rights. 235 Ga. at 581, 220 S.E.2d at 913.
130. GA. CODE ANN. §69-308 (1967). This statute requires notice of claim to the municipal
governing authority within six months of the event.
131. For a discussion, see R. SENTELL, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA
145.
132. 136 Ga. App. 682, 222 S.E.2d 583 (1975).
133. Id. at 691, 222 S.E.2d at 589. The court noted that the last paragraph of the notice
itself stated that it was "submitted to you, the members of the consolidated counsel (sic),
the City Attorney and the City Clerk ... as required by law."
134. 135 Ga. App. 712, 219 S.E.2d 341 (1975).
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next friend or guardian ad litem."' '
A novel notice quandary pertaining to power of the municipality was
presented by City of Claxton v. Claxton Poultry Co."'3 There the court
decided that after receiving a statutorily sufficient notice, the municipality
was without power to require additional information or demand that the
claimant appear before the governing authority for an "informational hearing.""'3 At that point, explained the court, "the municipality was required
to consider and act on the claim by settlement or denial.'

3

In 1974 the General Assembly authorized local governments to purchase
liability insurance and to defend legal actions brought against their officials or employees and arising from the performance of their duties.' 31 In
1976 this statutory authorization was the object of constitutional attack,
but emerged with a judicial stamp of approval. In Horn v. City of
Atlanta,40 the supreme court upheld the statute against due process challenges, with the following elaboration: "We point out that this statute does
not "require" the city to defend any civil action against its employees, but
merely permits it to do so, pursuant to an adopted policy, as a part of the
compensation paid by the employer to the employee.''

B.

Counties

Home Rule
Local government "home rule" can be viewed in at least two contexts:
as an authorization to the locality, and as a restriction upon the state. Two
recent decisions by the supreme court appropriately make this point for
Georgia counties.
In Brewster v. Houston County, I citizens sought to enjoin the governing
authority and the county sheriff from maintaining offices in a municipality
other than the county site.4 3 Relying upon the county home rule amendment to the Georgia Constitution,'" the supreme court sustained the trial
judge's decision, which required "official county business (decision making
process of the board which includes deliberation and voting on any issue
of county business) to be conducted at the county site but permitting
135. 135 Ga. App. at 715, 219 S.E.2d at 344. The municipality had not been added as a
party defendant until after the notice of claim had been presented to it.
136. 134 Ga. App. 679, 215 S.E.2d 718 (1975).
137. Id. at 679, 215 S.E.2d at 719. The court emphasized that the notice in issue was
"more than sufficient" in affording the municipality the required elements of information.
138. Id.
139. Ga. Laws, 1974, p. 702, GA. CODE ANN. §§89-943 to 945 (Supp. 1975). See Sentell,
Local Government Law, 26 MER. L. REV. 143, 173 (1974).
140. 236 Ga. 247, 223 S.E.2d 647 (1976).
141. Id. at 248, 223 S.E.2d at 648.
142. 235 Ga. 68, 218 S.E.2d 748 (1975).
143. The plaintiffs alleged that only a "token office" was maintained at the county site.
144. GA. CONST. art. XV, §2-A, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-8402 (1973).
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administrative facilities to be located outside the county site."'45 Under its
home rule power, therefore, the county was permitted to locate both its
administrative facilities and the sheriff's office outside the county site.
The other perspective was presented by Richmond County v. Pierce,'"
an action by a former county attorney for an increase in his retirement
payments. The court viewed his action as relying on a 1971 local statutory
amendment to the county-pension-fund act'47 and proceeded to determine
the validity of that amendment. In arriving at that determination, one of
the points considered by the court was the impact of the 1966 countyhome-rule amendment to the constitution.' One of the provisions of that
amendment, the court held, "vested sole authority over compensation,
retirement, etc., of employees of county governing authorities, in the
county governing authorities.""'4 Consequently, the General Assembly
"was without authority" to enact the 1971 amendment to the pension act,
and the lower court had thus erred in granting a summary judgment for
the plaintiff. Under the home rule provision, therefore, the General Assembly's power over county employees had been restricted.
Elections
The county election was the subject of two decisions by the supreme
court during the survey period, and one of those decisions makes a considerable contribution to Georgia local government law. First, however, in
White v. Miller'5" the court held that the Georgia Election Code' 5' is not
the exclusive means of challenging eligibility for county office and that a
defeated candidate for membership on a school board therefore could pursue the remedy of quo warranto against the successful candidate. "They
do not serve precisely the same function," the court said, "because an
election contest is brought by or on behalf of the unsuccessful candidate,
but quo warranto is brought by or on behalf of the people for the protection
of the public."' 52 Without clearly expressed legislative intent to supplant
the process of quo warranto, the court was unwilling to imply such an
145. 235 Ga. at 71, 218 S.E.2d at 750.
146. 234 Ga. 274, 215 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
147. Ga. Laws, 1971, p. 3881. The plaintiff claimed the right to an increase of one-third
the increased compensation being paid the present county attorney.
148. GA. CONST. art. XV, §2-A, 2, GA. CODE ANN. §2-8403 (1973).
149. 234 Ga. at 280-81, 215 S.E.2d at 670. The court emphasized that the decision did
not necessarily preclude the plaintiff's recovery, for the county resolutions which had been
passed under the invalid 1971 local statute might still be valid under the home-rule amendment. But this point would have to be determined, and the case could not be the subject of
a summary judgment at this juncture.
150. 235 Ga. 192, 219 S.E.2d 123 (1975).
151. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 34 (1970).
152. 235 Ga. at 192, 219 S.E.2d at 124. The point in issue was whether the five-day period
for bringing the action under the Election Code applied to the plaintiff's action, which was
not brought within that period of time.
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intent from the Election Code. 5 3

The more important decision was that rendered in Smith v.
Abercrombie,'54 the supreme court's first confrontation with the process of
governmental recall.'55 This process-culminating in a special election by
which the voters determine whether an official is to complete the ordinary
term of office-is deeply rooted in American history and is used in varying
degrees around the country. In Georgia its presence in a local government
structure depends upon local legislation, but instances of it are not difficult
to discover. Such an instance was the 1975 local statute that introduced
the process to Douglas County and that led to an election recalling the
chairman of the board of county commissioners.'15 The chairman's assault
upon the validity of the recall statute was a broad-spectrum one, and a
majority of the supreme court afforded a point-by-point consideration of
it. The court concluded that the advertised notice of the local statute
complied with the constitution's command; that the state possessed the
power to provide recall processes for its local governments; that the lelegis-,
lature's non-uniform treatment of county commissioners was not violative
of equal protection; that the local statute was not precluded by existing
general law; that recall did not abolish or modify a term of office as prohibited by the constitution; and that the statute was not invalidated by the
vice of retroactivity, because the right to public office is not a "vested" one.
Thus, at least in the context of local legislation for Georgia counties, the
recall process was upheld against a plethora of constitutional protests. As
an initial commitment to uncharted terrain, the opinion in Smith v.
Abercrombie was about as broad as could have been reasonably anticipated, and its ramifications portend intriguing promise for the future.' 5
Officers and Employees
Two crucial aspects of county employment are those of appointment and
dismissal, and both were the subjects of litigation during the past year.
As to appointment, Williams v. Cates'5 ' presented the question how
many nominations, from which the governing authority was to select members of the county board of elections, had to be submitted.' 5 Focusing upon
153. The court noted that the repealer clause of the Election Code makes no reference to
quo warranto proceedings.
154. 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975).
155. For a rather extensive discussion of the process, its history and utilization, as well
as specific treatment of Smith v. Abercrombie, see Sentell, Remembering Recall in Local
Government Law, 10 GA. L. Ray. 1976.
156. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 2512.
157. For the prediction that additional movement on local government recall is forthcoming in Georgia, see Sentell, Remembering Recall in Local Government Law, 10 GA. L. REv.
(1976).
158. 235 Ga. 651, 221 S.E.2d 422 (1975).
159. The action was one in quo warranto and had been brought when the governing
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the controlling local statute, " " the supreme court conceded that "we have
found no interpretation which renders all portions of this Act sensible.""'
Nevertheless, the court concluded that in the absence of an express requirement, " Ithe appointing authority was authorized to submit only two
names to the governing authority to fill two posts on the elections board.
Dismissal was the point in controversy in several cases. In Kirton v.
Biggers,' 3 the court of appeals sustained the county commissioners' dismissal of the chairman of the board of tax assessors. Under the controlling
statute, "' held the court, it was immaterial that the commissioners may
have prejudged the case. The notice given to the chairman was deemed
sufficient, "5 the chairman could be held accountable for the entire board's
conduct,' 6 and the commissioners possessed discretion as to the level of
performance they were willing to tolerate.6 7
Less successful was the effort of the commissioners to discharge the chief
tax appraiser in Richmond County v. Jackson." There the local statutes
provided that the appraiser was to be hired by the board of tax assessors
subject to the approval of the commissioners."' The supreme court concluded that the power to hire includes the power to fire but the power to
approve does not. Accordingly, only the board of tax assessors possessed
and the trial court's injunction
the power to discharge the chief appraiser,
76
against the commissioners was upheld.
authority insisted upon six nominations rather than two from which to select two members
of the board.
160. Ga. Laws, 1967, p. 3211.
161. 235 Ga. at 652, 221 S.E.2d at 424.
162. The court said that in other situations the General Assembly had included express
requirements.
163. 135 Ga. App. 416, 218 S.E.2d 113 (1975).

164.

GA. CODE ANN.

§92-6904 (Rev. 1974).

165. The court summarized the notice as providing that a hearing would be held, giving
time, date, and location; reciting the history of the case; and specifying the law with which
the chairman had allegedly failed to comply. A similar decision on the point of notice, but
controlled by a different statute, was that rendered by the supreme court in Goodin v.
Ramsey, 235 Ga. 671, 221 S.E.2d 432 (1975). There the court held that under Ga. Laws, 1975,
p. 360, GA. CODE ANN. §32-2101c(b)(1976), a written memorandum of March 31 was a sufficient notification prior to April 15 that a tentative decision had been made by the county
board of education not to renew the teacher's contract for the successive school year.
166. "If the appellant is charged with grounds for removal, it is no defense that the other
two members of the board are not likewise charged." 135 Ga. App. at 418, 218 S.E.2d at 116.
167. No abuse of that discretion had been shown.
168. 234 Ga. 717, 218 S.E.2d 11 (1975).
169. Ga. Laws 1974, p. 3069.
170. Decided upon a narrower point was Capes v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 1, 218 S.E.2d 764
(1975), a controversy over whether the chairman of the county commission possessed the
power to dismiss county employees. The supreme court held that under local statutes the
individual commissioner had no standing to seek a declaration or mandamus on behalf of the
entire board to require the chairman to exercise any duties, but he did have the right to have
his accusation against the chairman considered by the entire board.
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Self-interest on the part of officers and employees is always a serious
issue, and it is controlled in part at the county level by a statutory prohibition against sales by officers or employees to counties, "unless it shall be
made clearly to appear that the said individual, partnership or owner of
the store offers and will sell the goods or property as cheap as or cheaper
than it can be bought elsewhere."'' In DaltonRock Products Co. v. Fannin
County,"I a commissioner sought to justify his charge for hauling rocks for
the county by evidence showing that he had charged the "standard
price.' ' 3 Concluding that no summary judgment could be rendered in
favor of the charge, the court of appeals reasoned that "the record does not
affirmatively disclose that the hauling could not have been done by someone else at a lower rate."'7
Legislation
In respect to county legislation, the constitution's proscription on local
or special statues must be confronted.'75 A recent instance of the exercise
came in the supreme court's consideration of Powell v. Board of Commissioners of Gwinnett County. I That case presented an action turning upon
the validity of a county ordinance that prohibited the issuance of beer and
wine licenses to locations within 1700 feet of a school. The challengers
pointed to the existence of a general statute prohibiting the sale of beer or
wine within 300 feet of any school:'77
Appellant's argument is that the general statute, enacted by the legislature, has withdrawn from local governments the power to regulate the sale
of beer and wine insofar as distance from a school is concerned. His contention is that the regulatory ordinance is in conflict with the general
statute, and that the ordinance must therefore fall ...."I
Without citation to a single authority, a unanimous supreme court offered
as its entire response the following conclusion:
Code Ann. §58-724.1 establishes only a "minimum distance" for the retail
sale of wine and beer from a school or schoolhouse. We do not interpret
this statutory restriction to mean that a local governing authority cannot
establish, pursuant to its police power authority, a distance restriction
171. GA. CODE ANN. §23-1713 (1971).
172. 136 Ga. App. 649, 222 S.E.2d 93 (1975).
173. The county denied the validity of the purchase contract on the ground that the
commissioner had a direct pecuniary interest in it.
174. 136 Ga. App. at 650, 222 S.E.2d at 94.
175. See the discussion accompanying notes 40-46, supra. See also, Sentell, When is a
Special Law Unlawfully Special?, 27 MER. L. REV. 1167 (1976).
176. 234 Ga. 183, 214 S.E.2d 905 (1975).
177. GA. CODE ANN. §58-724.1 (1965).
178. 234 Ga. at 184, 214 S.E.2d at 907.
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that is greater than three hundred feet. We therefore hold that the ordinance is not unconstitutional.' 7'
Powers
Cases concerning county power are as assorted as the subjects with
which counties attempt to deal, and this was well illustrated by controversies recently before the appellate courts. In Kinney v. Brown,'88 for instance, the plaintiff sought a mandamus ordering the county to issue a
permit to build on land that the county contended had been dedicated to
it. Sustaining the county's position, the supreme court focused upon a
recorded plat showing the land as a right of way with the notation "not to
be opened now." Although this land had never been graded or paved, the
court held that a dedication to the public had been effected and that "the
county was without authority to grant the building permit thus recognizing
a claim of ownership in appellant."' 8
Almost as drastic as mandamus is the action for injunction, and the
court registered this point in McDowell v. Judges Ex Officio.'8 2 It there
rejected a request to enjoin the county's governing authority from building
a courthouse complex and emphasized that "no existing substantive issues
are raised by the complaint which can be adjudicated."' 83 Because the
plaintiff's allegations amounted only to an argument that the authorities
might violate the law if they proceeded with the complex,8 4 any judicial
opinion on the matter would be advisory in nature.'85 Such opinions are
impermissible even in actions for declaratory judgment, not to mention the
"more rigorous remedy" of injunction. The court said, "An evidentiary
hearing which produced evidence in support of all the appellant's wellpleaded allegations would not authorize this injunctive relief because it
would be based upon circumstances, conditions and events which may or
may not occur in the future."'8 8
179. Id. at 185, 214 S.E.2d at 907. With this conclusion, compare that reached by the court
of appeals in Pace v. City of Atlanta, 135 Ga. App. 399, 218 S.E.2d 128 (1975), discussed in
the text accompanying notes 42-46, supra.
180. 234 Ga. 578, 216 S.E.2d 798 (1975).
181. The court reasoned that "those claiming under such conveyances are estopped from
denying the existence of the streets so delineated upon the plat of the subdivision and given
as boundaries of lots acquired by these and others from the grantor or those claiming under
him." Id. at 578-79, 216 S.E.2d at 799.
182. 235 Ga. 364, 219 S.E.2d 713 (1975).
183. Id. at 365, 219 S.E.2d at 714.
184. These allegations included the charges that the defendants were proceeding with the
complex in the face of an adverse county referendum, that they had failed to use federal funds
and thus caused the plaintiff's property taxes to escalate, and that should the county borrow
funds it would violate the constitutional limitation.
185. "The law presumes these public officers will follow the law in the exercise of their
statutory duties and authority." 235 Ga. at 365. 219 S.E.2d at 714.
186. Id. at 366, 219 S.E.2d at 714. The trial court's dismissal was thus affirmed. As
tenuous as the plaintiff's position in McDowell was that of the county in the criminal case of
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The court's restrictive view was carried over to City of Warrenton v.
Johnson,"7 an action by the municipality to enjoin the county commissioner from removing the city police booth from the corner of the county
courthouse property. Disputing the municipality's claim of an easement
running with the land, the court was unable to find valid authority from
the county's oral permission: "Oral contracts on behalf of a county have
repeatedly been held to be void, thus the permission here could never ripen
into a valid easement."'' 8 Consequently, the municipality had located its
building with only the county's acquiescence, which could be terminated
at any time."'
Schools
At issue in Wilson v. Strange'" was the validity, meaning and ramifications of a contract between two county boards of education concerning
each board's acceptance of students from the other school district. At the
instance of one board whose children were refused admittance by the other
board, the supreme court reached the conclusions that the dispute was not
"a local controversy" required by statute to be heard by the State Board
of Education;"' that the contract was authorized by both the constitution
and statutory law;" ' that the defendant board had ratified the contract by
accepting benefits under it"' and was estopped to deny validity because
of the other board's reliance upon it;'" that the school board was not
required to enter the contract upon its minutes;" ' that reformation of the
contract was inappropriate;' that tuition payments were not required
Neal v. DeKalb County, 135 Ga. App. 761, 219 S.E.2d 14 (1975). There the court of appeals
reversed a conviction under a county ordinance which prohibited selling and canvassing from
house to house in residential areas. The court said there was a lack of evidence that defendants were selling in a residential area or going from house to house. Thus the evidence was
insufficient to authorize a conviction.
187. 235 Ga. 665, 221 S.E.2d 429 (1975).
188. Id. at 666, 221 S.E.2d at 430-31, relying on GA. CODE ANN. §23-1701 (1971). The
municipality had relied upon alleged original parol permission, later written permission, and
its expenditure of funds on building improvements.
189. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of injunctive relief.
190. 235 Ga. 156, 219 S.E.2d 88 (1975).
191. GA. CODE ANN. §32-910 (1976). The court said such controversies were those within
one school system, not between two county boards.
192. "Therefore, Banks and Habersham Counties had the power to enter into a contract
under which students of one county would attend the schools of the other, with state funds
flowing to the system educating the child." 235 Ga. at 160, 219 S.E.2d at 93-94.
193. By reporting transferring students in its average daily attendance reports, the board
had received $218,000 in capital-outlay funds.
194. This reliance was shown by not providing teachers, supplies and facilities for the
transferring students.
195. The court distinguished school boards from county commissioners in this respect.
196. "It is a well settled rule that the courts will not interfere with the decisions of a school
board unless the act violates the law or is a gross abuse of discretion." 235 Ga. at 161, 219
S.E.2d at 94.
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either by the contract or by law, 97 and that no demand could be made for
damages based on the individual tort and contract liability of the defen98
dant board members.
Roads
The county's obligation to maintain roads was the issue litigated in two
cases before the supreme court during the past year. In Stein v. Maddox 9'
the court denied the plaintiff property owners a mandamus on a number
of fronts.2°° Without evidence proving the road impassable, held the court,
the plaintiffs failed to establish their right to a mandamus under a statute
requiring the county to maintain a public road in passable condition. 20
Moreover, the court sustained the validity of a quitclaim deed from the
county to an abutting property owner, even though the one dollar cited as
20 2
consideration was never paid.
Under the evidence in this case, the county received substantial consideration for the quitclaim deed by being relieved of the burden and expense
of maintaining this roadway. We hold this was legally sufficient in the
absence of evidence showing that more advantageous consideration could
have been obtained by the county for the quitclaim deed. m
The county was not as fortunate in Ross v. Hall County Board of
Commissioners,204 where a majority of the court found that the mandamus
should issue as a matter of law. Although the court conceded that a deed
of the road in question was ineffective, 2" it nevertheless held that the road
had passed to the county. Uncontradicted evidence offered by the plaintiffs showed that the road had been expressly dedicated to the public and
impliedly accepted by the county. "The defendants presented no evidence
at all to counter the clear and unrebutted evidence of the plaintiffs as to
the care and maintenance of the roads."2 "
197. The court said that requiring such payments would unduly restrict the bargaining
power of the parties.
198. The acts had not been performed maliciously as required by tort law, and "public
officials" are not "liable personally on contracts entered into by them within the scope of their
authority." Id. at 163, 219 S.E.2d at 95.
199. 234 Ga. 164, 215 S.E.2d 231 (1975).
200. The trial court had granted the county's motion for summary judgment, and the
supreme court affirmed.
201. GA. CODE ANN. §64-102 (1966).
202. The plaintiffs were held to be without standing to raise the issue of the county's
failure to provide notice to a former property owner before granting the deed.
203. 234 Ga. at 175, 215 S.E.2d at 238-39.
204. 235 Ga. at 309, 219 S.E.2d 380 (1975).
205. This was because the deed was signed by the president of the grantor corporation
only in his individual capacity.
206. 235 Ga. at 313, 219 S.E.2d at 384. Justice Jordan dissented.
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Taxation
The sheer volume of litigation over county taxation was almost overwhelming during the survey period, and only brief reference to some of it
can be attempted. One of the more noteworthy episodes was that embodied
in Chanin v. Bibb County,"'7 an action challenging the constitutionality of
the 1974 Uniform Beer Tax Act and two related county ordinances.10 Splitting the focus of its consideration, the supreme court first invalidated one
of the ordinances as imposing a wholesale purchase tax rather than "license fees and taxes" as authorized.2 "1Upholding the validity of most of
the 1974 statute as well as the remaining ordinance, however, the court
arrived at a number of conclusions. The taxing authority under the statute,
it reasoned, was not the county but the state; thus, only uniformity of
taxation within the state was required by the constitution. 10 In then determining that state uniformity was present, the court construed the statute
to require that "these taxes be imposed in mutually exclusive fashion, by
municipalities within their boundaries and by counties within their unincorporated areas." '' The court did invalidate the 1974 statute's "grandfather clauses" which attempted to give the counties three years to bring
their beer tax levels in line with the statute. "However beneficial such a
system may seem to local budgets," said the court, "we cannot agree that
it meets the requirements of the uniformity provision." '
Most of the litigation revolved around property taxation, and in that
respect the valuation function is always a controversial one. In Wade v.
Ray,"' the supreme court held that the county tax assessors' determination
of the fair market value of real property by one method and of the fair
market value of tangible personal property by another method was not
violative of the constitution's uniformity-of-taxation command. In Chilivis
v. Backus,"' however, the court did condemn the trial judge's confinement
of "fair market value" to "the actual present use of the property." "While
'actual use' of property is one determinative factor in finding fair market
207. 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975).
208. Ga. Laws, 1974, p. 1447, GA. CODE ANN. §58706.1 (Supp. 1975). This statute directed
the imposition of an excise tax upon wholesalers for the sale of malt beverages in municipalities and counties at a level of, basically, 5 cents per 12-ounce container.
209. This ordinance had been adopted prior to the 1974 statute and was based upon a local
authorizing amendment to the constitution. Consequently, the court held, it was limited by
that amendment. The remaining ordinance was adopted pursuant to the 1974 statute.
210. GA. CONST. art. VII, §1, 3, GA. CODe ANN. §2-5403 (1973). The court reaffirmed its
view that the General Assembly possessed the power to direct cities and counties to levy taxes
for local purposes.
211. 234 Ga. at 289, 216 S.E.2d at 255.
212. Id. at 290, 216 S.E.2d at 256. The court thought it "per se unreasonable to create
classes of taxpayers based only on prior nonuniformity of taxation within their differing
areas."
213. 234 Ga. 234, 214 S.E.2d 923 (1975).
214. 236 Ga. 88, 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976).
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value," said the court, "it is not the exclusive factor."215 Finally, in Aldon
Industries, Inc. v. Gordon County Board of Tax Assessors," ' the court of
appeals viewed evidence as establishing that real property in the county
was appraised at less than fair market value. Accordingly, personal property-which was appraised at fair market value-was the subject of an
unjust tax burden."1 7
In 1972, the General Assembly replaced the arbitration system of handling county-taxpayer dissatisfication with a system centered in county
boards of tax equalization." ' This replacement was the subject of considerable judicial attention during the past year. Perhaps the most important
instance was Tax Assessors of Gordon County v. Chitwood,11 a taxpayer
challenge to a county re-evaluation program that led to an increase of
$29,000,000 in the tax digest. Viewing the attack as a claim sounding
basically in non-uniformity," the supreme court responded that "the General Assembly has invested county boards of tax equilization with ample
authority to remedy this kind of deficiency in an ad valorem tax digest. ' 22 '
Even considering this authority judicial in nature, it would be authorized
by the legislature's constitutional power to create "additional courts. ' 222
Consequently, the board of equalization was held to provide "an adequate
remedy for the failure at the county level to obtain uniformity of assessment between individual taxpayers, 2'2 3 and the trial court had erred in
22
exercising its equitable jurisdiction to hear the case. 1
215. Id. at 91, 222 S.E.2d at 374. The court noted that in 1975 the General Assembly
added criteria to be considered in determining fair market value. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 96.
216. 136 Ga. App. 598, 222 S.E.2d 42 (1975), GA. CODE ANN. §92-5702 (Supp. 1975).
217. Selected real estate transactions were used to show real property values, and it was
stipulated that personal property was valued at fair market value.
218. GA. CODE ANN. §92-6912 (1974). The statute provides that a taxpayer may appeal
his assessment by the board of tax assessors to the board of equalization, and this board has
the power to order the tax assessors to obtain uniformity.
219. 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975).
220. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their attacks upon specific aspects
of assessment procedures were distinct from their claim of non-uniformity.
221. 235 Ga. at 153, 218 S.E.2d at 763. "This provision would seem to authorize the board
to order the entire digest recompiled if 'such action . . . is necessary to obtain uniformity.'"
222. GA. CONST. art. VI, §1, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-3601 (1973).
223. 235 Ga. at 155, 218 S.E.2d at 764. The court distinguished earlier cases, which had
turned upon a construction of the prior statute creating the arbitration system, as well as
cases dealing with the process of equilization at the state level.
224. The plaintiffs had requested the court to declare the tax digest void and to enjoin
collections under it, and the trial court had complied with that request. In two cases during
the period, the court of appeals dealt with contests which had gone first to the board of tax
equalizers and then to trial by superior court jury. In Murray v. Richardson, 134 Ga. App.
676, 215 S.E.2d 715 (1975), the court held the jury's verdict-finding values below those of
the assessors but not those of the equalizers-to be authorized by the evidence in the case.
The court held untimely a motion made during the jury trial to disqualify one of the equalizers because of his relation to one of the taxpayers. In Hodson v. Duckett, 135 Ga. App. 922,
219 S.E.2d 634 (1975), the court held that since the enactment of a statute, Ga. Laws, 1974,
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The court has reaffirmed its Chitwood rationale in a number of contexts.
In Webb v. Board of Tax Assessors,25 it rejected both due-process and
equal-protection attacks against the statute creating county boards of
equalization. The statute provides for ample notice, hearing, and appeal,
said the court, and is applicable to all properties and property owners
alike.22 6 Again, in Butts County v. Briscoe,22 the court denied the plaintiffs'
claim to injunctive relief from the alleged failure of the county tax assessors to make uniform assessments as between county taxpayers. 2 2
Chilivis v. Kel 229 presented the court with appeals from a trial judge's
refusal to enjoin assessments that were not uniform among individual taxpayers in the county and his temporary restraint of the State Revenue
Commissioner's collection of state taxes.13 Relying upon Chitwood, the
court agreed that the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief because of the alleged failure of the assessors "to make uniform assessments
as between individual taxpayers in Douglas County.""' The problem with
the Revenue Commissioner's duty to insure uniformity of assessments between property owners in different counties2 2 was distinct. "It would create
a chaotic condition in the tax affairs of the state," said the court, if individual taxpayers in each county could challenge factual decisions of the Revenue Commissioner. "If objection is made to the exercise of the discretion
of the State Revenue Commissioner in equalizing digests, it must come
from the county, and not from individual taxpayers. '"m Consequently, the
trial judge's order of temporary restraint was reversed.
As formulated by the supreme court, the entirely different "basic question" raised by Newton County Board of Commissioners v. Allgoodz 4 was
"whether the board of education has the legal right to establish a millage
p. 609, GA. CODE ANN. §92-6912(6) (Supp. 1975), no presumption of correctness attaches to
assessments made by the board of equalization; the court condemned assessment made on
values which did not fall within the range of unchallenged testimony by the taxpayers'
witnesses.
225. 235 Ga. 790, 221 S.E.2d 810 (1976).
226. The court also upheld the county grand jury's appointment of the members of the
tax-equalization board.
227. 236 Ga. 233, 223 S.E.2d 199 (1976).
228. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint against the State Revenue Commissioner.
229. 236 Ga. 226, 223 S.E.2d 117 (1976).
230. From evidence in the case, the judge had concluded that residents in Douglas county
were paying higher state ad valorem taxes than those in five surrounding counties.
231. 236 Ga. at 228, 223 S.E.2d at 119.
232. This duty is imposed by GA. CODE ANN. §92-7001 (1974).
233. 236 Ga. at 229-30, 223 S.E.2d at 120. "Here the duty of the State Revenue Commissioner to equalize the digests is acknowledged, but it is asserted that he performed his duty
in an inappropriate manner." On a point of procedure, the court held that the board of tax
assessors possesses no power to extend the twenty-day time period allowed by statute in which
nonresident taxpayers may appeal their notices of assessed value to the board of equalization.
Tift v. Tift County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 234 Ga. 155, 215 S.E.2d 3 (1975).
234. 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975).
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rate to produce revenue for the maintenance and operation of public
schools on a digest as finally approved by the State Revenue Commissioner, or is it bound by its original levy on a digest prepared by the tax
assessors which is rejected by the revenue commissioner and is subsequently, at the request of the tax assessors, factored by the revenue commissioner so as to increase the assessed value of property in the county."' 1
To resolve this question, the court looked to the constitutiono and said
that under it, "the board of education shall certify; the fiscal authority
(board of commissioners) shall levy." 27 Effective certification, reasoned
the court, depended upon the school board's having the correctly assessed
value of county property. Until the revenue commissioner determines the
tax digest to be valid, therefore, the certification function cannot be finally
performed. In this case, then, the board of education was not bound by
its original levy on the digest disapproved by the commissioner.
The period witnessed at least two controversies over claimed exemptions
from property taxes. Adams v. Dawn Memorial Park"I centered upon the
constitution's exemption for cemetery land 40 and its applicability to an
unsuccessful cemetery venture.24' The supreme court held that an affidavit
showing extensive effort and promotion but disappointing sales, large
losses and a decision to sell amounted to a prima facie showing of good
faith. Upon the county tax commissioner's failure to respond to that affidavit, a summary judgment to enjoin tax collections was appropriate.
More noteworthy was the court's decision in Wages v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 2 where the defendant New York corporation contended that a
county ad valorem tax on tires and tubes in its Georgia distribution warehouse was an unconstitutional tax on "imports." ' Designating the issue
one of "first impression" and "a complicated federal constitutional question," the court traced from 1827 the U.S. Supreme Court's evolution of
the "original package doctrine." ' It then translated this doctrine as follows:
235. Id. at 13, 214 S.E.2d at 526. The board of commissioners had adjusted downward the
original recommendation of the board of education to correspond to the upward adjustment
of the digest by the revenue commissioner.
236. GA. CONST. art. VIII, §12, 1, GA. CODE ANN. §2-7501 (1973). The court said the entire
local control of the schools is thus placed in the hands of the board of education.
237. 234 Ga. at 17, 214 S.E.2d at 529.
238. Otherwise, the tax assessors would have a veto power over the board of education,
said the court.
239. 234 Ga. 105, 214 S.E.2d 542 (1975).
240. GA. CoNST.art. VII, §1, 4, GA. CODE ANN. §2-5404 (1973).
241. The tax commissioner argued that the land had not been held in good faith for
cemetery uses.
242. 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349 (1975).
243. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl.2.
244. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
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Such importers are free to deal with their goods as imports after the goods
are in this country; and, if they do so, the goods remain immune from state
taxation. When, however, the importer deals with his goods as a seller,
. . .the goods become subject to state taxation."-'
Applying this translation to this case, the court decided that tires, which
had been imported in bulk without packaging and which had been sorted,
segregated and commingled, had lost their status as imports and were
subject to county taxation. Protected from such taxation, however, were
the imported tubes in cartons-they enjoyed "original package" immunity. In a fitting benediction for this entire section, the court explained that
"what we do in this case is to merely 'draw a line,' and it is, admittedly, a
2 46
difficult line to draw.
Liability
The status of a Georgia county, historically more immune to tort liability than municipalities, has long been declared by statutory law: "A
county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by
statute." ' 7 This immunity was challenged from several perspectives in
Revels v. Tift County,2 48 an action for injuries allegedly received in a fall
inside the courthouse. Emphasizing the long tradition of immunity and
describing its recent elevation to the constitutional plateau, 24 9 a majority
of the supreme court rejected the plaintiff's claim of unconstitutionality.2 0
The contention that the county had previously compensated for comparable injuries was likewise dismissed, with the following observation: "The
defendants would not be estopped by such unauthorized waiver of the
sovereign immunity of the county. ' ' 25" Finally, declared the court, the
county's alleged purchase of liability insurance was permitted only in respect to its motor vhicles 25 2 and "does not constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity in regard to damages caused by the c6 unty's negligence not
2
connected with motor vehicles."
Citing its decision in Revels, the court dismissed a mandamus action in
245. 233 Ga. at 722-23, 214 S.E.2d at 355.
246. Id. at 723, 214 S.E.2d at 355.
247.

GA. CODE ANN. §23-1502 (1971).

248. 235 Ga. 333, 219 S.E.2d 445 (1975).
249. This had been the court's prior interpretation of the results of a 1974 constitutional
amendment which authorized the General Assembly to create a state court of claims but
declared that it did not waive sovereign immunity per se. See Sheley v. Board of Public
Education, 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975). The statutory declaration had existed since
1895, the court said.
250. Chief Justice Nichols dissented.
251. 235 Ga. at 335, 219 S.E.2d at 447.
252. GA. CODE ANN. §56-2437 (1971). For discussion in general, see Sentell, Tort Liability
Insurance in Georgia Local Government Law, 24 MER.L. REV. 651 (1973).
253. 235 Ga. at 335, 219 S.E.2d at 447.
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Wayne County Board of Commissioners v. Warren,254 an effort by the
county sheriff to require the commissioners to provide funds to settle a
judgment entered against him in a civil rights proceeding.115 Noting that
under statutory law counties must pay premiums on bonds furnished by
their sheriffs 56 and may purchase insurance to protect them against
personal liability,257 the court reasoned as follows: "Except for the payment
of the premiums above mentioned, a county has no liability in connection
''
with the violations of the civil rights of any person by a county officer." 25
5
2
9
Watkins v. Cobb County Commission presented an effort in the court
of appeals to avoid county immunity by pursuing alternative approaches.
The property damage there complained of allegedly arose when a
builder-with a permit from the county-caused a sanitary sewerage system to become blocked and sewage overflowed into the plaintiff's home.
Rebuffing the plaintiffs' efforts, a majority of the court held no action for
nuisance to exist, because "the condition was abated promptly by the
defendant county. ' 20 Neither were the plaintiffs entitled to constitutional
recovery:26'
No public use or purpose was involved here, but merely the tying-in of a
private development into the public sewerage system by the private
developer. The developer, not the county, was responsible for the "taking
or damaging," and the commission, rather than ratifying the act, moved
2 2
swiftly to repudiate it and correct its resulting damage. 1
Likewise denied, but upon a different rationale, was the plaintiff's claim
for just and adequate compensation in Martin v. Hall County. 213 If the
alleged trespass and property damage had occurred upon land belonging
to the county rather than the plaintiff, reasoned the court, then no compensation would be forthcoming. By upholding the validity of a deed to the
254. 236 Ga. 150, 223 S.E.2d 133 (1976).
255. This judgment had been rendered by a federal district court, and the sheriff contended that it was a legitimate operational expense of his office which the county had an
affirmative duty to pay.
256. GA. CODE ANN. §89-405.1 (1971).
257. GA. CODE ANN. §89-945 (Supp. 1975).
258. 236 Ga. at 152, 223 S.E.2d at 134. The court reversed the trial judge's grant of the
mandamus.
259. 135 Ga. App. 324, 217 S.E.2d 298 (1975).
260. Id. at 325, 217 S.E.2d at 299.
261. The constitution commands that just and adequate compensation be paid before
private property can be taken or damaged for public purposes. GA. CONST. art. I, §3, 1, GA.
CODE ANN. §2-301 (1973).
262. 135 Ga. App. at 325, 217 S.E.2d at 299-300 (emphasis in original). A dissenting
opinion by Judge Evans, concurred in by Judge Deen, contended that a "public purpose"
unquestionably was being served.
263. 134 Ga. App. 775, 216 S.E.2d 655 (1975). The damage complained of was the removal
from a road right of way of a sign advertising the plaintiff's business.
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county26 ' and rejecting the contention of abandonment, 65 the court affirmed the trial judge's issuance of a summary judgment for the county.
Lance Roofing Co. v.Gwinnett County Board of Education6 ' presented
the issue whether a county board of education could be sued for failure to
comply with statutory requirements for payment bonds on public work
contracts."'1 Disagreeing with the court of appeals,26 8 the supreme court
held that such liability was possible: "We hold that a board of education
is a public board within the meaning of Code Ann. §23-1705, that it is
subject to suit under Code Ann. §23-1706, and that the trial court did not
err in finding that the board of education is subject to being sued, as such,
in this case." '69
Zoning
By far the most controversial zoning decision rendered by the Supreme
Court of Georgia during the past year was that of Barrett v. Hamby.2° In
what the dissent charged was "a sharp departure" from the historic view,2'
the majority of the court voided a single-family-home zone as an unconstitutional county "taking" of the plaintiff's property."2 In reaching this conclusion, the court constructed the following doctrinal backdrop: "As the
individual's right to the unfettered use of his property confronts the police
power under which zoning is done, the balance the law strikes is that a
zoning classification may only be justified if it bears a substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morality or general welfare." 3 This did not
mean that the disputed classification must render the plaintiff's property
"totally useless;" it was enough if "the damage to the owner is significant
and is not justified by the benefit to the public.""'
Applying these guidelines to the classification in issue, the court noted
the existence of commercially zoned land bordering the plaintiff's prop264. The court engaged the presumption of validity for duly registered deeds and upheld
both the property description and the recited consideration.
265. Merely not using a strip of land in its entirety was insufficient to show abandonment
of a piece of land as a highway location, said the court.
266. 235 Ga. 590, 221 S.E.2d 23 (1975).
267. The plaintiff subcontractor in work on a school buiilding alleged the board's violation
by accepting the payment bond of a certain surety company.
268. 134 Ga. App. 800, 216 S.E.2d 627 (1975).
269. 235 Ga. at 593, 221 S.E.2d at 25. The court distinguished cases which it viewed to
involve breach of contract or tort actions not authorized by specific statute. Here, it said, the
statute expressly provided for liability when the public board "has not taken a payment bond
in the required manner or form."
270. 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975).
271. Id. at 269, 219 S.E.2d at 404.
272. Zoning, said the court, "is subject to the constitutional prohibition against taking
private property without just compensation." Id. at 265, 219 S.E.2d at 401.
273. Id. at 265, 219 S.E.2d at 402.
274. Id. at 266, 219 S.E.2d at 402.
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erty,1 5 the location of a cemetery in the center of the property,275 and of a
high school near the property,2"" and "expert" testimony of the greatly
increased value of the property if commercially developed.277 In opposition
to these considerations, it noted the county commissioners' determination
that enough commercially zoned property already existed. The court concluded, "This alleged community welfare interest is too vague and thus
weighs too lightly in the balance to offset the owner's substantial injury
'
by the R-20 designation."278
Consequently, the zone was declared void, and
the county was ordered to reclassify the plaintiff's property."
An appropriate point of contrast with Barrett, both in context and result, was provided by Martin Marietta Corp. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission.8 0 There were two appeals by the property
owner-one in mandamus and one in certiorari-from the commission's
denial of a conditional use permit for developing a crushed stone quarry.
Considering the mandamus action, the supreme court observed that the
local amendment to the constitution under which the commission was
created delegated the power to zone" ' and that the commission had enacted a comprehensive plan. That plan listed 27 uses that might be permitted upon the commission's finding of fact but not as a matter of right. In
this context, therefore, the commission possessed discretion, mandamus
was inappropriate, and review by certiorari was the correct remedy.
Focusing upon the certiorari action, the court reviewed the evidence on
both sides and concluded that "the commission's decision was justified by
that evidence, and that the commission's decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, and confiscatory as a majority of this court found the decision
of the Board of Commissioners to be in Barrett v. Hamby.282 Again, the
''unique constitutional authority" of the commission was controlling,
and-in that context-this situation was not one presenting a "purely
discretionary denial of a use permit for a use that is permitted upon the
applicant's complying with certain specified conditions.' '81 Consequently,
the commission's denial was sustained.
275. No natural boundary divided the two, said the court.
276. These, a real estate broker testified, were obstacles to development of residential use.
277. Even the county planner conceded that the plaintiff's property would be difficult to
market as residential land.
278. 235 Ga. at 266, 219 S.E.2d at 402. The court said, "[W]e require that the board
justify its determination, and sufficient justification here is missing."
279. The dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justice Jordan, was written by Justice Ingram, and argued that under this direction "every local zoning authority in Georgia ... must
now justify to the court every disputed zoning decision it makes." Id. at 270, 219 S.E.2d at
404.
280. 235 Ga. 689, 221 S.E.2d 401 (1975).
281. Under the general law, the court explained, a planning commission would not have
the power to zone.
282. 235 Ga. at 693, 221 S.E.2d at 403-04.
283. Id. at 693, 221 S.E.2d at 404.
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The court was similarly permissive in Wilson v. Sermons" in respect to
the trial judge's treatment of a challenge to a zoning variance for a mobile
home. In passing upon an application to enjoin the permitted use, said the
court, the judge was possessed of "extensive discretion." This discretion
would not be disturbed when the record failed to show that the grant of
unlawful or that the plaintiff had suffered harm from the
the variance was
28 5
home.
mobile
In Royal Atlanta Dev. Corp. v. Staffieri,8 6 the supreme court considered
what it designated an "important question" of zoning jurisdiction. Reversing the court of appeals, 27 it observed that, by statutory provision, only
"enforcement decisions" are appealable to a board of zoning appeals 281 and
held that a planning commission's recommendation was not such a decision.2 81 The power of zoning enforcement lies with the county governing
authority, said the court, and thus the board of zoning appeals has no
jurisdiction over an appeal from
the planning commission's approval of a
"planned unit development.2 19
II.

LEGISLATION

A.

Home Rule

Although declared unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court in
1953,21 the Municipal Home Rule Law of 1951292 had never been repealed
by the General Assembly. 293 Although later events were probably not sufficient to render the statute effective without a specific reenactment, 294 the
284. 236 Ga. 400, 223 S.E.2d 816 (1976).
285. 236 Ga. at 400, 223 S.E.2d at 817. Only a manifest abuse of that discretion would
warrant the supreme court's disturbance of his order. In Cook v. Howard, 134 Ga. App. 721,
215 S.E.2d 690 (1975), the court of appeals said that when the county zoning board of appeals
was authorized to grant a variance only because of the exceptional nature of the property, it
had no power to grant a variance because the aged owners needed someone to live near them
in a mobile home.
286. 236 Ga. 143, 223 S.E.2d 128 (1976).
287. 135 Ga. App. 528, 218 S.E.2d 250 (1975).
288. GA. CODE ANN. §69-1211 (1967).
289. The planning commission had no power, said the court, "to issue or withhold building permits." 236 Ga. at 146, 223 S.E.2d at 130.
290. "Therefore, the approval or disapproval of a planned unit development by the Planning Commission is not, and cannot be construed as, an enforcement decision appealable to
the Zoning Board of Appeals under Code Ann. §69-1211." Id.
291. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953).
292. Ga. Laws, 1951, p. 116.
293. For a discussion, see Sentell, Home Rule Benefits or Homemade Problems for Georgia Local Government?, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 317 (1968), reprinted in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN
GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 273 (2d ed. 1973).

294.
(1973).

See Sentell, Unconstitutionalityin Georgia: Problems of Nothing, 8 GA. L. REv. 101
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1976 General Assembly decided to take no chances. It expressly repealed
9 5
the 1951 "home rule" statute."
B.

Annexation

In the law of annexation, many jurisdictions have evolved the concept
of "contiguity"-the necessity of some kind of affinity between a municipality and the territory annexed to it.2" In Georgia, the term has been
stated and defined by the legislature, but it appears that only one munici2 7
pal annexation has ever been judicially invalidated for lack of contiguity. 1
In 1974, the Georgia Supreme Court surprised many by sustaining the
validity of municipal ordinances annexing tracts located varying distances
from the original corporate limits and which were connected to those limits
by only the length of state highways also annexed by the municipality."'
In thus approving a version of "strip annexation," the court appeared to
29 9
be in tension with the general judicial trend elsewhere.
In 1976, the General Assembly appeared to disapprove of the supreme
court's approach; it amended the 1962 and 1966 annexation authorizations
to specify that only the width of roads, rivers and railroads were to be used
31
in establishing contiguity between a municipality and annexed territory.
0
Remarkably, however, this statute expressly delays its effective date until
January 1, 1977.
C.

Elections

Two of the recently enacted statutes dealing with local government elections are appropriate for mention. The more noteworthy was the General
Assembly's authorization to municipalities and counties to declare persons
3
at least 18 years of age eligible to hold any non-judicial office. 0'
The other statute amended the 1974 Campaign and Financial Disclosure
Act102 in a number of respects. Among the changes were the requirements
that candidates for county office file their reports with the office of probate
295. Ga. Laws 1976, p. 259.
296. For a discussion, see Sentell, Municipal Annexation in Georgia: The Contiguity
Conumdrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974).
297. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 277 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970). For a
discussion of this decision, see Sentell, Municipal Annexation in Georgia: Nay-Sayers
Beware, 5 GA. L. REV. 499 (1971), reprinted in R. SENTELL, STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

at 363 (2d ed. 1973).

298. City of Gainesville v. Hall County Bd. of Educ., 233 Ga. 77, 209 S.E.2d 637 (1974).
299. For a discussion of this decision, see Sentell, MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia: The
Contiguity Conumdrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974).
300. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1011.
301. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 464. This declaration is to be made by a local ordinance. The
statute specifies a residency requirement of 24 months.
302. GA. CODE ANN. §40-3801 et seq. (1975).
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judge and that those for municipal office file with the municipal clerk or,
'30 3
if there is no clerk, "the chief executive officer of the municipality.
D.

Officers and Employees

Several measures enacted by the 1976 General Assembly might be
loosely designated as dealing with local government officers and employees. Among these, the one which applies to both municipalities and counties is the complete revision of the garnishment laws of the state.3 4 This
enactment specifically declares that "salaries due officials or employees of
the State government and of its political subdivisions, departments, agencies and instrumentalities shall be subject to garnishment." The summons
must be directed to the political entity, and, for the purpose of this statute,
local governments are treated as private persons.
Two of the measures operate exclusively at the county level. First,
county governing authorities are required to keep the courthouse and offices maintained there open for business for at least 40 working hours each
calendar week.305 Second, any county officer, except a probate judge, who
is convicted of a felony is immediately suspended from office, and the
Governor is to appoint a replacement for the duration of the suspension.3 0
Should the conviction later be overturned, the officer is immediately reinstated.
Officers, agents and employees of municipalities are authorized to serve
any process, summons, notice or order, where the condition or activity in
question is conducted within the municipality in violation of law or ordi307
nance.
E.

Finances

The 1976 legislature entered the arena of local-government finances by
enumerating additional types of securities in which the proceeds of bonds
of municipalities, counties, school districts or other political subdivisions
might be invested or reinvested.35 In addition, the General Assembly expressly prohibited Georgia local governments from petitioning for relief of
debts or for composition of debts "under any federal statute providing for
such relief or composition" or to otherwise take advantage of such federal
309
statutes.
303. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1424.
304. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1608.
305. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1522.
306. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 277. If the suspended officer is a commissioner, the replacement
is the remaining commissioners.
307. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 188.
308. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 400.
309. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1558.
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F. Taxation
In recent years, the legislature has been almost as concerned with property taxation as have the appellate courts. Its 1976 session yielded several
products of this concern. Among these was the express requirement that
notices sent to local-government taxpayers show both the fair market value
and the assessed value of the property subject to taxation.3 10 At the county
level, residents were given 15 days to file a notice of appeal with the board
of county tax assessors."' Qualifications for members of county boards
were added:" ' First, tax appraisers were declared ineligible to serve on the
board of tax assessors, and second, both tax appraisers and tax assessors
were barred from membership on the board of equalization.
At the contest stage, the legislature established, as a condition precedent
to the superior court's jurisdiction of a property taxpayer's complaint, the
requirement that the "taxpayer shall pay the amount of ad valorem property taxes assessed against the property at issue for the last year for which
taxes were finally determined to be due on such property."3 3' At the payment stage, county tax commissioners or collectors were permitted to receive checks or money orders for tax payments without personal liability.2'"
To avoid this liability, however, the tax collector or commissioner must
have been authorized to receive the checks or money orders by the county
governing authority and must follow prescribed procedures in an effort at
collection.
Property-tax exemption was withdrawn for public real property owned
by a political subdivision and located outside the territorial limits of the
subdivision. " Exemption was retained for such property, however, if developed and used to a specified extent, if 300 acres or less in area, if owned
by a municipality but located inside the county of the municipality, or if
designated and used as a watershed.
In addition to the attention it gave property taxation, the General Assembly also sought to refine and perfect various provisions of the 1975 local
sales tax statute.2" These changes dealt with effective dates, referendum
conditions, county-wide voting, and the county and municipal rollbacks. '7
G.

Contracts

In the realm of local government contracting capabilities, at least two
1976 measures deserve mention. The first is the statutory authorization to
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
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Ga.

Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
Laws,
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1976,
1976,
1976,
1976,
1976,
1976,
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366.
1744.
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municipal and county fire departments to form a "mutual aid resource
pact."31 The creation of this pact is designated a public corporation, and
its primary purpose is to provide aid in fire emergencies. These systems
are empowered to acquire property and equipment and to enter into agreements with state and federal agencies. They are to be established along the
boundaries of counties in which the member jurisdictions are located.
The other authorization is more limited and applies only to county
boards of health. This enactment empowers the boards to make contracts
and establish fees "for the purpose of providing mental and other public
31
health services.""
Operations of these services must be approved by the
district director of health.
H.

Property

For the first time, the 1976 legislature treated directly by general law the
sale of municipal property. 30 The statute specifies that sales of both real
and personal property are to be made "to the highest responsible bidder"
by either sealed bids or auction after a prescribed notice has been given to
the public.32 An exception to these requirements is provided for the sale
of lots from a municipal cemetery, or personal property with an estimated
322
value of $500 or less.
I.

Zoning

Attempting to sum up the authority of Georgia local governments on the
subject, a 1976 statute declares that "each county and each municipality
and any combination of any such political subdivisions may exercise the
'3
power of planning and zoning. "
318. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 742.
319. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1420.
320. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 350.
321. The actual procedures for the sale are also treated.
322. Excepted also are municipalities with charter provisions which include the minimum
notice requirements specified by the statute.
323. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1014.

